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Mueller v. Angelone
181 F.3d 557 (4th Cir. 1999)
I. Facts
On October 5, 1990, Charity Powers ("Powers"), a ten-year-old girl,
was abducted, raped, and killed. Months later, upon receiving indications
that Everett Lee Mueller ("Mueller") might have been involved, police
searched Mueller's backyard and found Powers's body and a knife buried
there. Mueller was arrested and advised of his rights under Miranda v.
Arizona.1 During a videotaped interrogation, Mueller confessed to the rape
and murder.2
On September 11, 1991, Mueller was convicted by a jury of rape and
abduction with intent to defile. He was also convicted of capital murder in
the commission of abduction with intent to defile and capital murder in the
commission of, or subsequent to, rape. The jury found Mueller to be a
future danger to society and his crime to be vile and sentenced him to death
on the two capital charges. Mueller exhausted his direct appeal and state
habeas proceedings and his first petition for federal habeas corpus relief was
dismissed.3 Mueller appealed this judgment to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, based on the following assertions: (1) the
application of-the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(CAEDPA")4 to his case had an impermissible retroactive effect; (2) AEDPA
violates the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution; (3) the
circumstances of his confession violated his right against self-incrimination
under the Fifth Amendment and his right to counsel under the Sixth
Amendment; (4) the alleged withholding of exculpatory evidence by the
Commonwealth violated Brady v. Maryland'; (5) his trial counsel was
1. 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding that "the prosecution may not use statements,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant
unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against
self-incrimination").
2. Mueller v. Angelone, 181 F.3d 557, 563-64 (4th Cir. 1999).
3. Id. at 564-65.
4. Pub. L. No.104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (amending 28 U.S.C. Title 153).-
5. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that "suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution").
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ineffective; and (6) he was wrongly denied an evidentiary hearing on his
Brady and ineffective assistance claims.6
II Holding
The Fourth Circuit determined that AEDPA applied and found no
basis for federal habeas relief in the claims advanced; thus, it denied Mue-
ller's motion for a certificate of appealability and dismissed the appeal!
III. Analysis /Application in Virginia
A. AEDPA and Retroactive Effect
Mueller argued that, though his federal habeas petition was filed post-
enactment of AEDPA, application of AEDPA to his case would have an
impermissible retroactive effect because his claim arose prior to the enact-
ment of AEDPA. In addressing this claim, the court looked to Lindh v.
6. Mueller, 181 F.3d at 565-86.
7. Id. at 587. The court's disposition of some of Mueller's claims will not be discussed
further in this article due to their insignificance to Virginia capital practice. These claims are
discussed briefly below.
Mueller claimed that AEDPA violated the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution, which declares the Constitution the supreme law of the land. The court,
noting that the Supremacy Clause concerns conflicts between state and federal law, not state
and federal judiciaries, rejected Mueller's argument that AEDPA strips from the federal
courts the power vested in them by Article LI by restricting the scope of federal habeas
review. The court noted that it had previously rejected a similar argument made under the
Suspension Clause of the Constitution. Id. at 572-73. See U.S. CONST. art. I, S 9, cl. 2.
Mueller also claimed four instances of ineffective assistance of counsel. Mueller's first
ineffective assistance claim was that his counsel searched for neither evidence of Mueller's
susceptibility to falsely confessing nor evidence of his innocence. Mueller's second assertion
of error was that his attorney did not present any evidence of his innocence. The court,
relying on the fact that Mueller told his trial counsel that his confession was accurate and that
he was guilty, rejected Mueller's argument that this inaction fell below the objective reason-
ableness standard of Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). But seeJasonJ. Solomon,
Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 367,372 (1999) (analyzing Sexton v. French, 163 F.3d 874 (4th Cir.
1998), and examining the duty of counsel to present certain exculpatory evidence even if it
is against the wishes of the defendant). The court also held that Mueller failed to show that
the outcome of the trial was prejudiced by these alleged deficiencies. Mueller, 181 F.3d at 579-
81.
Mueller's third and fourth ineffective assistance claims, that trial counsel conceded his
guilt in dosing arguments and failed to offer a first-degree murder alternative instruction to
the jury, were barred from review on federal habeas due to the state procedural default rules
regarding arguments raised in appellate briefs. The court rejected Mueller's argument that
the page restrictions on his brief prevented his compliance with these rules and found federal
habeas review of these claims barred. Lastly, Mueller argued that the district court erred in
denying his request for an evidentiary hearing on his Brady and ineffective assistance claims.
The court rejected this argument because no information was added to that available to the
Supreme Court of Virginia on direct appeal which would warrant an evidentiary hearing
under 28 U.S.C. S 2254(e)(2). Mueller, 181 F.3d at 581-87.
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Murphy,8 which held that Congress had intended "to apply the amendments
to chapter 153 only to such cases as were filed after [AEDPA's] enactment"
and not to cases pending at enactment."
The court noted the two interpretations of Lindh.'° Many courts have
read Lindb to mean that AEDPA necessarily applies to petitions filed after
April 24, 1996.11 A second interpretation, which the court adopted here, is
that for claims arising prior to AEDPA's enactment, but for which federal
habeas petitions on the claims were filed post-enactment, AEDPA will apply
only if its application will not have an impermissible retroactive effect.12 In
order to assess impermissible retroactive effect, the court used the test
applied in Landgrafv. USI Film Products." Under Landgraf a new statute
should be applied in cases in which its application would have a genuinely
retroactive effect only where Congress has clearly expressed its intent that
the statute act retroactively. 4
Mueller argued that the view which takes impermissible retroactive
effect into account was correct. Further, Mueller thought that his case was
one in which, though his federal habeas petition was filed after the date of
AEDPA's enactment, application of AEDPA would have an impermissible
retroactive effect to his claims originating pre-enactment. The court agreed
with Mueller's analysis for AEDPA application, but it also found that
AEDPA would not have an impermissibly retroactive effect in his case."
In undertaking its Landgrafanalysis, the court looked to whether "the new
provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its
enactment." 6 The court used the concepts of fair notice and reasonable
reliance to reject Mueller's arguments that his appellate litigation strategy
had relied uon the federal habeas requirements in effect prior to AEDPA's
enactment.
8. 521 U.S. 320 (1997).
9. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997).
10. Mueller, 181 F.3d at 565-66.
11. Id. at 566. See, e.g., Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 868 (4th Ci. 1998), cert. denied,
119 S. Ct. 844 (1999); Breard v. Green, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
12. Id. at 567-69. See, e.g., In re Hanswerd, 123 F.3d 922, 934 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding
that AEDPA did not apply to bar filing of second or successive petition under 28 U.S.C. S
2255 where first petition was filed before date of enactment); In re Minarik, 166 F.3d 591 (3rd
Cir. 1999) (concluding that Lindh did not mandate application of 28 U.S.C. S 2244's limita-
tion on the filing of second or successive federal haeas petitions to a case in which its
application would have a genuine retroactive effect).
13. 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
14. Mueller, 181 F.3d at 568.
15. Id. at 572.
16. Landgrafv. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 269-270 (1994). See Mueller, 181 F.3d
at 569.
17. Mueller, 181 F.3d at 569-70. Mueller's burden per Landgrafwas merely to show that
1999]
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The court's analysis of this point clarifies the circumstances in which
federal habeas petitions will be held to AEDPA standards. The necessity of
conducting Landgraf retroactivity review is important for the small set of
cases in which claims arising pre-enactment of AEDPA might be barred
from federal habeas review because the federal habeas petition was filed after
AEDPA's enactment.'" In argument for federal habeas review of these
claims, counsel must show that reliance on the pre-AEDPA procedures
hindered appellate argument. The scathing review the court accords
Mueller's arguments regarding reliance should deter superficial claims of
retroactive prejudice.' 9 However, strong reliance-based arguments may
convince a court not to bar consideration of claims in federal habeas pro-
ceedings per section 2254 of AEDPA.
B. Self Incrimination
Mueller argued that both his right not to incriminate himself and his
right to counsel were violated during the interrogation which led to his
confession. During interrogation, Mueller was advised of and waived his
Miranda rights. Mueller asked Detective Garber ("Garber"), "Do you think
I need an attorney here?" 2' Garber replied with a shrug and said, "You're
just talking to us."21 After this exchange, Mueller confessed to the rape and
murder of Powers.22
Mueller first argued that the failure of the police to cease the interroga-
tion when Mueller asked whether he needed an attorney superseded his
he "might have acted differently had he known that his conduct would be subject to the new
law," not necessarily that he did rely on the prior law. Id. at n.6. Specifically, Mueller tried
to argue the following: (1) that he had lacked incentive to pursue adjudication on the merits
of his federal claims in state court; (2) that he had lacked incentive to raise all claims on
certiorari to the Supreme Court on direct appeal; and (3) that the state courts lacked incentive
to diligently review his federal claims due to lack of knowledge of the deferential review that
their decisions receive under the newly enacted AEDPA. These claims were dismissed
summarily by the court and were criticized as without merit and bordering on frivolous. Id.
at 570-72.
18. Claims arising post-enactment are not entitled to Landgraf retroactivity analysis.
Id. at 568.
19. Id. at 570-572. Specifically, Mueller argued retroactive effect in his case for the
following reasons: (1) he had lacked incentive to pursue in state court the merits adjudica-
tions of his federal constitutional clAiims due to the pre-AEDPA regime which only required
him to exhaust his state court remedies in order to get independent and de novo review of
these claims by the federal habeas court; (2) he omitted some claims from his petition for a
writ of certiorari that he would have included had he foreseen the tougher habeas standard
by which the claims would be measured; and (3) the state courts lacked the incentive to
diligently review his federal claims because they were unaware of the degree of deference to
those decisions. Id.
20. Mueller, 181 F.3d at 573-74.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 574.
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initial waiver of his right to have counsel present.23 The court rejected this
claim because Mueller's question did not constitute an "unambiguous
request for counsel,"24 which would require police to stop the questioning
under Edwards v. Arizona." The court noted also that the United States
Supreme Court reiterated this rule in Davis v. United States, stating that a
suspect must "unambiguously request counsel" before officers must halt the
interrogation.26
Additionally, Mueller argued that Garber's response to Mueller's
question invalidated the initial waiver of his Miranda rights.2 The court
rejected this claim based upon the totality of the circumstances which
showed Mueller's extensive experience with and understanding of Miranda
rights.2 Due to this understanding, the court found that Garber's actions
could not affect the voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver by Mueller
of his Miranda rights.29
Mueller also argued that he invoked his right to remain silent by asking
to be taken to jail during the interrogation. The court, finding that Muell-
er had not clearly asserted his right, rejected this argument.3
C Brady Issues
Mueller argued that the Commonwealth, in violation of Brady, failed
to disclose the fact that a witness had seen a photographic line-up prior to
trial and possibly had failed to identify Mueller as the man seen talking to
Powers on the night of the murder. 2 Although the court conceded that the
line-up identification may have been marginally exculpatory, it noted that
Mueller could not demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result
23. Id. at 573-74.
24. Mueller v. Commonwealth, 422 S.E.2d 380, 387 (Va. 1992).
25. 451 U.S. 477, 487 (1981) (requiring interrogations to stop upon an unequivocal
request for counsel).
26. 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).
27. Mueller, 181 F.3d at 574.
28. Id. at 574-75.
29. Id. at 575.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 575-76. The court's analysis of this issue has little practical value for Virginia
capital practice. As a general rule, defense counsel should note that when a defendant has
requested the assistance of counsel, Miranda violation claims should be couched in the
language of Edwards and Davis. Specifically, defense counsel should argue that the defen-
dant's request for counsel was unequivocal, but that even if the defendant's request was not
unequivocal, the totality of the circumstances (for example, ignorance of the defendant or
officer coercion) was such that the defendant's request nevertheless necessitated the halting
of questioning.




would have been different at trial had the prosecution disclosed the exculpa-
tory evidence prior to trial.3 This standard was announced by the United
States Supreme Court in United States v. Bagley. 4 The court emphasized
that the evidence was disclosed at trial and was used by the defense in
summation.35 This disclosure permitted the defense to use the evidence to
its advantage in closing statements, allowing jurors to make inferences
beneficial to the defense as to exculpatory evidence not disclosed pre-trial.36
Moreover, the court noted the tremendous effect of Mueller's videotaped
confession and Mueller's ability to lead the police to the crime scenes,
evidence which made a witness placing Mueller and Powers together on the
night of the murder unnecessary. 7
In Mueller's case, the late-disclosed Brady evidence did not materially
damage his case, in part because of the tremendous amount of evidence the
Commonwealth had against Mueller. However, the use of evidence uncov-
ered by a Brady motion is critical to the defense in other cases. For exam-
ples of motions to compel discovery under Brady, please contact the Virginia
Capital Case Clearinghouse.
Kimberly A. Orem
33. Id. at 578.
34. 473 U.S. 667, 681 (1985).
35. Mueller, 181 F.3d at 577.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 577-78.
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